sonal relations between it and ourselves. The abstractness of the other affirms and enforces the irreducible otherness of the Spiritual Life over against the world of nature, both within ourselves and without. But if it justifies both, it also insists on the dangers to which both are exposed. The anthropomorphic element in religion tends to assimilate the truths of religion to even the pettiest and most variable of man's experiences in time. The speculative element, on the other hand, tends to make of those truths mere empty frameworks of thought without any substantial content of life.

It may safely be said of Professor Eucken's book that it marks an era in the appreciation of religion. We are passing through an epoch of religious revolution when none of the customary and traditional forms in which religion has established itself among men can be regarded as sacred and intangible. At such a moment of crisis this book will prove one of the most trustworthy of guides as to what may pass and what must remain, under it may be renewed forms, in the reconstruction which is coming, and which only an enlarged and deepened religious life can prepare.

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The Interpretation of Religious Experience. The Gifford Lectures for 1911-12. By John Watson, LL.D. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1912. 2 Vols. Pp. xiv, 375; x, 342.

This book is an attempt to establish religion on a firm metaphysical basis. The first volume is taken up mainly with considering the influences of philosophy upon the evolution of religion, and in particular, of Christianity. Starting from Plato and Aristotle, Professor Watson traces the history of philosophy, showing how the failure of each system in some particular to supply the understanding with a satisfactory formulation of the nature of reality, leads on to the creation of a new system to supply the deficiencies of the previous one, this new system being doomed in its turn to be rejected as inadequate and superseded by some other.

It must inevitably happen that any review of other systems of philosophy will be colored by the private metaphysical views of the writer. Professor Watson, being much influenced by

Hegel, finds throughout the whole history of philosophy a continuous effort of the understanding to grasp reality as a self-dependent whole, and to find some one formula or what he calls 'principle' which shall satisfactorily sum up its perfect unity. He proceeds to show how each successive system has had to be rejected in turn because it failed to do this, which he takes to be an ultimate postulate of the understanding.

His exposition of the various philosophical systems themselves seems to me clear and as sympathetic as can be expected from any philosopher who has finally made up his mind as to what the real truth is. The statement of the position of each seems to me to be impartial and accurate: it is too much to expect that the criticisms of any one school of philosophy shall not seem to unbelievers to arise sometimes from an external and superficial view of the philosopher's real meaning, and so to miss the point.

In Volume II, Professor Watson enters upon the constructive part of his task. "The possibility of constructing a philosophy of religion," he tells us, "presupposes these two principles: firstly, that the universe is rational; and, secondly, that it is capable of being comprehended in its essential nature by us." To be rational and intelligible, according to Professor Watson, involves being three things: (a) "an absolute unity" as contrasted with a mere aggregate. "An aggregate is not a unity because it implies the *separate*[1] and *independent* existence of particulars which have no *necessary connection* with one another." The unity of a whole "cannot depend upon the arbitrary choice of a conscious subject but must belong to the object itself." (b) Self-differentiating. "The unity cannot be a dead, unchanging identity, but, on the contrary, it must express itself in an infinity of changes. These changes, however, must be *due* to nothing but itself." "An absolute unity in virtue of its very nature must differentiate itself in its parts, and this differentiation is therefore no *accident,* but the expression of what *is* and *must be.*" (c) A coherent system. "Every element in the whole must be related to every other so that any change in one element will involve a correspondent change in all."

It is assumed, then, that we cannot construct a philosophy of religion unless the universe is rational and intelligible accord-

[1] Italics all mine throughout.

ing to the above definition. In Professor Watson's opinion, however, it must be; otherwise no true judgment about experience would be possible. "If knowledge is to begin or develop, it can only be under the presupposition of the rationality and intelligibility of the universe." His ground for this statement is that our knowledge of universal laws cannot be got from the enumeration of any number of particular instances, but involves a fundamental presupposition which cannot be arrived at empirically and yet without which we have no ground for passing by inference with the help of our universal laws from what we know to what we do not. This principle he imagines to be nothing less than the rationality and intelligibility of the universe. Here, to my mind, he makes his first grave mistake. It is unnecessary to go into the question as to what is really the principle on which induction rests. It is sufficient to point out that whatever this principle may be, it is merely hypothetical, that is, it makes no assertion about what reality is, or is not. All that it says is that *if* there is any similarity between any two things or series in so far as we know them both, this gives some probability that further analogies will hold between them. This does not affirm that all reality can be formulated into universal laws: some such principle as the above could still hold even if there were as a matter of fact no two things in the least similar to one another and each thing followed a completely unique law of its own. It could hold even if there were no things at all.

Professor Watson, however, is satisfied that the possibility of true knowledge demands the assumption of some principle which asserts the unity, self-differentiation, and coherence of the universe: he next goes on to discover what this principle is. Tracing the gradual growth of scientific knowledge, we find that it develops by subsuming less general disconnected laws under more general ones. The mind, he thinks, will never be satisfied until it has reached one all-embracing law which shall contain all the others within it. We do not create laws, we discover them: they really do unify their instances. For this reason Professor Watson seems to think they may be looked upon as creating their instances, themselves enjoying an eternal reality outside time and space. "Laws," he says, "constitute the life and meaning of the word." This supreme principle, whose discovery is the ultimate goal of science, unifies, dif-

ferentiates itself into instances, and forms them into a coherent system. It therefore turns out to be identical with that principle of the rationality of the universe whose existence was held to be demanded by the possibility of true knowledge.

This supreme principle is therefore real, and he calls it God. Laws, he says, are nothing without their instances, nor instances without their laws: God, therefore, necessarily manifests Himself in the universe and it is inseparably dependent on Him. In Volume II, Lecture Six, we learn the nature of this principle. "All stages of experience are gathered up and concentrated in the moral life: . . . it *is* the whole of life since nothing can fall beyond it." "Spirit," and by this he means the moral law, "is that which constitutes the principle of unity manifested in nature, in man, and in the universe as a whole." "The world becomes for us a cosmos, an orderly and coherent world, only when it is conceived as a manifestation of Mind. . . . A law of nature, a law of society, is redeemed from arbitrariness only in so far as the human mind is able to grasp the principle which gives it meaning: and that principle can be nothing else than a phase of the eternal Mind."

This unifying principle, then, is the moral law and is completely good. This is the same as saying that God is completely good and so is the 'true' nature of the universe whose law He is. Man strives to realize the moral law, therefore it is his 'true' nature. In so striving he follows his 'true' nature and is therefore free and 'acts.' When he 'acts' he can do only relative evil, arising from an imperfect comprehension of the universal moral law which is the law which unifies and so may be said to create the universe; in other words, God's will. In following this moral law man acts according to his universal nature, and so is one with God's will, in so far as he clearly understands the moral law. In following his natural desires as an individual he does not act freely, but is compelled mechanically, like a star falling according to the law of gravitation. Man sins by willing a natural desire which is incompatible with his 'true' self. So Professor Watson explains sin: but I do not see how it could be accomplished, on this theory, try as a man might. His 'true' self always wills the universal moral law, in so far as he understands it, and only his 'true' self can will at all. Any other form of desire is really mechanical compulsion, because it belongs merely to the individual. It therefore seems to be

impossible to will a natural desire, and so to sin. All that is left of evil is the relative kind: when a man wills the moral law misunderstanding it.

Briefly, then, Professor Watson's metaphysical basis for belief in God is that all lesser universal laws point to there being one all-comprehensive law which reason demands. Such a law must further be an actual reality, since to presuppose the absolute unity of all reality is the only alternative to skepticism. Inspection discovers this all-comprehensive law to be the moral law. This law is absolutely good and may be said to create everything which it includes: we have therefore every right to call it God. To me the result of all this is to show that Professor Watson is in a terrible state of confusion about the nature of of law. The laws of science and all the laws by which we systematize experience are simply accounts of the way in which changes *do* occur. Laws may refer to unique series of changes, or, if several things change alike, they may include a great number of instances. If they did presuppose any universal law about reality, it would be one of their own kind. The moral law, on the other hand, is admitted to be ideal, in the sense that it is not an account of how things *do,* but how they *ought,* to behave. To say that such a law unifies reality conveys to me no intelligible meaning. Reality does not even act in accordance with it, since if it did, there would be no discrepancy between what ought to be and what is. Again, to call such a law man's 'true' nature seems equally meaningless. His 'true' nature is the law according to which he *does* act: admittedly this is not the moral law. Even supposing it were admitted that man has a universal nature, distinguishable from his individual one (and I think this notion is mixed up in Professor Watson's thought, arguing to it along the Kantian lines, from the strong similarity between the experiences of different individuals), still in any case the 'true' law of this universal nature would be one according to which all men *do* in fact act, and not the moral law.

So far as I can see, therefore, this metaphysical proof of God's existence falls to the ground, without there being any need even to raise the controversy between Monism and Pluralism. Even if it were proved beyond doubt that the universe must be one and not many, this fact could not give any support to religion along the lines here suggested.

If space had permitted, I should have liked to have added some further criticism of what seems to me to be the loose way in which Professor Watson allows himself to use such words as 'possible,' 'inseparable,' 'independent,' 'necessary,' 'real,' 'true,' 'accidental,' etc. But the fatal objection to his philosophical thinking seems to me to be his failure to grasp the meaning of law and causality. Confusion over these has been a stumbling block for philosophy for a very long time; it is a most troublesome problem, and greatly aggravated by the thought which has already been bestowed upon it, but the chief light which the present book throws upon it is as an illustration of the fatal effects of failure to disentangle it.

I am well aware of the superficiality of criticism which destroys without any attempt at building up again, but this is hardly the place to enter upon such an undertaking even if I were qualified to attempt it. The problem which Professor Watson attacks is, I think, one of growing interest to people at the present time, and, though I cannot pretend myself to feel satisfied with the solution which he offers, I am sure that this book will be of interest to all whose minds are occupied with the effort to find some rational justification for faith.

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THE BEYOND THAT IS WITHIN. By E. Boutroux. Translated by Jonathan Nield. London: Duckworth & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv, 138.

This little volume contains, besides the essay which gives its title to the work, translations of two addresses by M. Boutroux, one on "Morality and Religion," the other, delivered before the Bologna Congress of 1911, on the "Relation of Philosophy to the Sciences." All are pleasantly written and exhibit a sane and wholesome, if not a particulary profound, strain of thought. Of the three the title-essay is, in the present writer's opinion, the least striking. With its general thesis that, whereas positive science, concerning itself with the relations to be discovered among phenomena, never arrives at a true Infinite, such an Infinite is actually found in the inner life of the soul as it manifests itself in Art and Religion I find myself wholly in sympathy. And every now and then one has the pleasure of